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In modern art and art-criticism Kant’s philosophy has been passed on as 
a heritage of enlightenment: To exhibit self-criticism by drawing the 
boundary for possible knowledge.1 In art as in philosophy these boundary-
drawings tend to become projects of purification: What are the possibili-
ties for pure experience? Paintings’ acknowledgement of their own two-
dimensionality has been seen as the ultimate realisation of this 
self-reflective turn. Greenberg writes: “The tasks of self-criticism became 
to eliminate from the effects of each art any and every effect that might 
conceivably be borrowed from or by the medium of any other art. There-
by each art would be rendered ‘pure’, and in its ‘purity’ find the guarantee 
of its standards of quality as well as of its independence. ‘Purity’ means 
self-definition, and the enterprise of self-criticism in the art became one of 
self-definition with a vengeance.”2
In Kant’s aesthetics we may, however, see tendencies to overcome the 
self-referential reflection in favour of a focus on a pre-conceptual sensibil-
ity and confidence with the world.3 In the experience of beauty we feel 
“nature’s formal finality for our cognitive faculties.”4 My project in this 
article is to read Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of art as a radicalisation of 
this gesture of realism, and thus as an instance of a Kantian modernism 
that differs from the one outlined above by emphasising the reciprocity 
between man and world. Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophy can be seen as 
an attempt to give a theoretical account of the real reciprocity behind the 
experience of mutual accord discussed in Kant’s The Critique of Judge-
ment. In his refusal of Kant’s constitutive approach Merleau-Ponty leaves 
the anthropocentrism penetrating not only Kant’s theoretical philosophy, 
but also his aesthetical reflections, where the task of aesthetic judgement 
is to determine the conformity of the object to the requirement of under-
standing. The theory of art in Merleau-Ponty’s early text Phenomenology 
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of Perception (1945) is still structured by this anthropological self-reflec-
tion where art is seen as a perfect mirror for the subject; art is a paradigm 
of the body-subject as a unity of meaning and materiality.5 In Merleau-
Ponty’s late texts Eye and Mind (1960) and The Visible and the Invisible 
(VI) (posthumously edited 1964) this retraction of the gesture of realism 
is avoided: art is something we see according to,6 behind the projections 
of man in direction of the world.7
This ontological turn may save our relation to the world, but what 
Merleau-Ponty is about to lose sight of is the self-reflexive focus. The in-
vestigation of sensibility towards the world itself becomes a process of 
puri fication, where the contribution of the subject is what should be ef-
faced. In The Critique of Judgement the purification of the subjective ac-
count in aesthetical experience is proclaimed only to let the experience 
of beauty exhibit the pure form of the subject, and even this self-enlight-
ening self-effacement is intercepted by the dependent beauty exhibiting 
the ideal of beauty: the body of man.8 My suggestion is to introduce a 
parallel interception of the process of purification in Merleau-Ponty’s 
theory of art. Could a reinstallation of an anthropocentric perspective in 
his late philosophy open his theory to the reflection on corporeal subjec-
tivity and inter-human encounters found in contemporary art?
The incarnation of subjectivity 
Phenomenology of Perception can be read as a rehearsal of Kant’s critical 
project in Critique of Pure Reason, to overcome the dichotomy between ra-
tionalism and empirism by means of transcendental reflections. Because 
Merleau-Ponty discusses the problem of perception as it is experienced 
from one’s own body the book has, however, been understood as “radical 
empirism.”9 What this empirical reading loses sight of is the transform-
ation of the concept of the transcendental offered in Phenomenology of 
Perception. Merleau-Ponty connects transcendentalism to our body and 
being-in-the-world, and claims that the synthesizing and patterning func-
tion Kant attributes to understanding operates on the perceptual level 
and takes place in all parts of the nervous system.10 The body is itself 
an intentional structure, where the simplest movements imply outlines 
and projections of intention. I know my body through a body image that 
integrates my body into relation with a “spatiality of situation”11 that in-
cludes all the projects of the organism. Consciousness, subjectivity and 
understanding can thus not be separated from our corporeal practice: 
“Consciousness is being-towards-the-thing through the intermediary of 
the body.”12 Kant’s question about the possibility of certain knowledge is 
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transformed into a question about the possibility of a perceptual univer-
sality: “We must try to understand how vision can be brought into being 
from somewhere without being enclosed in its perspective.”13 In the early 
philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, the lived body and the transcendental sub-
ject is one and the same.
This embodiment of subjectivity implies a historicising of the condi-
tion of experience. As a lived body, the subject is always permeated by 
history, imprinted by natural and social surroundings. In the lived body 
history and nature converge: “The use a man is to make of his body is 
transcendent in relation to that body as a mere biological entity … It is 
impossible to superimpose on man a lower layer of behaviour which one 
chooses to call ‘natural’ followed by a manufactured cultural or spiritual 
world. Everything is both manufactured and natural in man”.14 Through 
the transcendental character of one’s own body the division between 
culture-inscribed and nature-given emerges together with the difference 
between the transcendental and the empirical. Factuality becomes a his-
torically specific transcendentalia. 
To articulate this factual and cultural situatedness15 of subjectivity, Mer-
leau-Ponty compares the body-subject to a work of art: “A novel, poem, 
picture or musical work are individuals, that is, beings in which the ex-
pression is indistinguishable from the thing expressed, their meaning, 
accessible only through direct contact, … In this sense our body is compar-
able to a work of art. It is a nexus of living meanings“.16 As this analogy in-
dicates, the theory of the subject in Phenomenology of Perception is close 
to the hermeneutical theory of art. From Herder’s theories of language 
through the historicism of the 19th century to the modernistic concept 
of form, we find reflections on the importance of the material aspects of 
signification. By expanding this aesthetic and cultural theory to a theory 
of man and relocating it in a transcendental theory about the subject, 
Merleau-Ponty completes the reflection on the situatedness of knowledge 
found in the humanistic tradition.
Art as a phenomenological investigation of space 
The shift in focus from cultural objects to one’s own body transforms the 
process of interpretation. Hermeneutics traditionally links subjectivity 
and understanding to language and thus sees interpretation of aesthetical 
objects as a linguistic operation. From the assertions that a unity of mean-
ing and materiality is found also in the subject, it follows that understand-
ing can not only be seen as an intellectual process, but also as a perceptual 
interaction. To reach what is going on between spectators and works of 
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art, theories of interpretation must confront the perceptual production of 
signification. 
Phenomenology of Perception can be read as a philosophical articula-
tion of the new trend in modernism around the middle of the 20th cen-
tury, when the formalistic self-reflection that had been an important strat-
egy both in art and art-theory was given a complement by investigations 
of our corporeal situatedness. This shift in focus is especially notable in 
performance-art in the 50s and 60s, where the body of the artist becomes 
the material medium of the art event.17 Also trends in more traditional 
works of art from the 20th century, such as dance and painting, may, 
however, appear in a new light from this corporeal-phenomenological 
point of view. The expressive use of the body in modern dance finds in 
this theory a suitable frame for re-thinking the scenic situation,18 and the 
transform ation of perspective in painting appears, as I will argue, through 
the phenomenological approach to space as a new realism instead of as a 
self-referential purification of the artistic medium. 
The Euclidian space, which the classical central perspective represents 
and Kant’s transcendental argumentation gave objectivity, is by Merleau-
Ponty recognised as a contingent and historically situated experience of 
space. The space we usually inhabit is not the geometrical space conceived 
by a thought trained by science, but a room for action experienced through 
the body. Things appear “as the goal of a bodily teleology, the norm of our 
psyco-physiological setting.”19 Our own situatedness is included, so that 
our perspective is immediately complemented by the scene seen from 
another point of view. “Thus every object is a mirror of all others. When I 
look at the lamp on my table, I attribute to it not only the qualities visible 
from where I am, but also those which the chimney, the walls, the table 
can ‘see’; but back of the lamp is nothing but the face it ‘shows’ to the 
chimney. I can therefore see an object in so far as objects form a system or 
a world.”20 In sense-perception the world and I are an ensemble. 
To understand the paintings of for example Cézanne, we must see them 
as articulations of this phenomenological space. Lines, forms and size in 
Cézanne’s pictures do not represent an abstract space, but show the world 
as a common place for man and things. This space is more real and less 
subject-oriented than the space represented in central-perspective: the 
cup has an inside even if it is not projectable from the front: “The ‘real’ is 
that environment in which each moment is not only inseparable from the 
rest, but in some way synonymous with them, in which the ‘aspects’ are 
mutually significatory and absolutely equivalent.”21 This phenomenologi-
cal perspectivism not only emerges in works of typical modern painters, 
Towards an Aesthetics of Reversibility
15
such as Cézanne, Picasso or Matisse, but can also be seen in social-realistic 
pictures, for example by Kaare Espolin Johnson. In Juksafiskere (1955) 
the boats are too small and the movements of the arms too large because 
this is how it feels to be in a boat out on the open sea. This experience of 
rowing a boat is what the picture communicates to the viewer.22 Works 
of art are prolonging complex corporeal experiences and appear as new 
sense organs in both the artist and the recipient.23 As an extension and 
application of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological investigation, we may, 
in analogy to Kant’s understanding of space as an empirical reality shaped 
according to “the constitution of our sensibility,”24 develop a concept of 
phenomenological realism to articulate this depicting of visual perception 
as an integrated part of our being-in-the world.25 
Phenomenology of Perception offers a fruitful approach to tendencies 
in modern art and sets interpretation free from the Kantian prioritising 
of form and the hermeneutical prioritising of intellectual understanding. 
Kant’s model of the subject as a unity constituting its surroundings is, 
however, retained, even if the subject now is understood as an empirical 
body. We are addressing and constituting the world through an “inten-
tional arc which brings about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of 
sensibility and motility.”26 Art and man are both individual unities consti-
tuting meaning. Later Merleau-Ponty himself claims that from this model 
of subjective constitution the complexity of exchanges between art, world 
and man is not to be seen. In Phenomenology of Perception he could not 
solve the problem of a perceptual universality because he started from the 
distinction between consciousness and object.27 
 Man as a system of intertwining 
In Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophy the transformation of the transcen-
dental strategy of argumentation is more radical. In Phenomenology of 
Perception the systems of exchanges and mirroring between subject and 
world indicates that we as subjects are always situated. In The Visible and 
the Invisible subjectivity is seen instead as emerging from the systems of 
exchanges. Robert Burch claims Merleau-Ponty “subvert the transcenden-
tal problem at its root by not admitting the dualist aporia that animates 
it.”28 From one perspective Merleau-Ponty is in a similar situation to Kant 
after his theoretical critiques: He has established a new structure to con-
ceptualise the relationship between man and world, but he has not shown 
how man and world come to exist for each other. Analogous to how Kant 
in The Critique of Judgement discusses the principle of finality as a prin-
ciple “without which understanding could feel itself at home in nature,”29 
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Merleau-Ponty explores the confidence between body and world. Kant 
complements the model of constitution by a regulative idea of mutual ac-
cord, and Merleau-Ponty substitutes the topic of the intentional arc with 
a model of reversibility between man and world. For both philosophers, 
the pre-objective focus moves philosophy towards aesthetics. In Eye and 
Mind painting is said to perform the “phenomenology of perception” that 
in his earlier text was executed as a theoretical investigation of psychol-
ogy. “The entire history of painting in the modern period, with its efforts 
to detach itself from illusionism and acquire its own dimensions, has a 
metaphysical significance.”30
 It is easy to recognise the parallels between these two strategies and 
read Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophy as a comment on Kant’s concept the 
beautiful. In the experience of the beautiful object our cognitive facul-
ties are brought into a free play since the world offers the imagination a 
form suitable for the requirement of understanding.31 Beauties of art and 
nature thus become paradigmatic examples of the possibility of experi-
ence. The idea of finality of nature is held, however, as a regulative a priori 
concept only concerning our subjective approaches and not ascribed to 
the world.32 We cannot give a theoretical account of it; only experience the 
teleology in the beauty of nature: “How is it possible to assume that nature 
is a complex of objects of taste? … But the correctness of this assumption 
may still be seriously questioned, while the actual existence of beauties of 
nature is patent to experience.”33 Merleau-Ponty’s approach can as I have 
claimed be seen as an attempt to establish the aesthetic experience of 
mutual accord as factual, concerning our real encounters with the world. 
He uses the aesthetic reflection to undermine the constitutive argumenta-
tion and build up a different kind of theory to explain the experience of 
mutual accord. 
This theory of a pre-objective accord is connected to Merleau-Ponty’s 
earlier contention about subjectivity and perception. In Phenomenology 
of Perception he claims that our subjectivity is itself corporeal, and that 
we presuppose in our experience that objects see each other, so that my 
vision is complemented by the reciprocal mirroring of the surroundings. 
Merleau-Ponty now draws a more radical conclusion from these insights, 
and asserts that subject and object are of the same kind. “Between the 
exploration and what it will teach me, between my movements and what 
I touch, there must exist some relationship by principle, some kinship.”34 
This means that the rest of the dichotomic structure that still occurs in 
Phenomenology of Perception is rejected. The perceiver and the perceived 
is “on the same map,”35 they are “as the obverse and the reverse, or again, 
Towards an Aesthetics of Reversibility
17
as two segments of one sole circular course.”36 He thus leaves the Kan-
tian anthropocentrism that follows from the transcendental structure of 
argumentation in Phenomenology of Perception, in favour of a kind of 
objectivistic anthropomorphism.37 Instead of describing lived experience, 
the world as it is seen form the perspective of man, as he did in Phenom-
enology of Perception, he tries to describe visibility itself, or “the world of 
visible things;”38 a sensible world including both man and objects. 
From this anti-subjectivist perspective, to perceive is to interact in a 
reversible field of exchanges between one’s own body and the body of the 
world. “This can happen only if my hand, while it is felt from within, is also 
accessible from without, itself tangible, for my other hand, for example, if 
it takes its place among the things it touches, it is in a sense one of them, 
open finally upon a tangible being of which it is a part.”39 In Phenomenol-
ogy of Perception the example of the touching of the touching hand is 
used to show the principal difference between subjectivity and the object. 
Now the same example is used to exhibit subjectivity as an intern-worldly 
event. While Kant bound the implications of the experience of reciprocity 
by connecting it to a regulative a priori judgement, and in this way is able 
to keep the anthropocentric perspective also in aesthetics, Merleau-Ponty 
transforms the aesthetical experience of mutual accord into an ontologi-
cal principle, a “teleology transcending the human”, as Smith calls it,40 and 
postulates reversibility as “ultimate truth.”41 To be a subject is no longer to 
pattern the world through our corporeal intentions, but to let oneself par-
ticipate in a complex structure of reversible intertwining. The synthesis, 
which both for Kant and the early Merleau-Ponty is the responsibility of 
the subject, occurs from mutual reversibility both between our different 
senses, and between the senses and the sentient. We experience our body 
as a perceptual unit where our different senses are exchangeable with 
each other and expect to be able to see what we can touch and touch what 
we see. This perceptual self-unity – it is me who touches, sees and hears 
– is an aspect of the unity of the object, which is given as the same thing 
through all my different senses, just like the synthetic and analytical unity 
coincide in Kant’s philosophy: “To know anything in space (for instance, 
a line),” Kant writes, “I must draw it, and thus synthetically bring into be-
ing a determinate combination of the given manifold, so that the unity of 
this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness (as in the concept 
of a line); and it is through this unity of consciousness that the object 
(a determinate space) is first known.”42 For Merleau-Ponty, however, this 
merging of subject and object is seen no longer as a transcendental struc-
ture, but as something accessible through phenomenological description. 
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Perception is understood as a circle or intertwining going on in the world, 
constituting both the subject and the object; “a relation of the visible with 
itself that traverses me and constitutes me as a seer, this circle which I do 
not form, which forms me, this coiling over the visible upon the visible.”43 
Man is an instance of a general system of intertwining. To be a subject 
means to be the place where the exchanges can happen: “A human body 
is present when, between the seer and the visible, between touching and 
touched, between one eye and the other, between hand and hand a kind 
of crossover occurs.”44 
The flesh
The universality of intertwining implies that exchanges also occur inde-
pendent of our subjective projects. All things are reversible in relation to 
each other, by exchanging light, nutrition, warmth and movements. What 
we ordinarily call properties is actually interaction between things, a kind 
of self-sensation of the world. A red thing is never purely red in itself, but 
gains its redness from light received from other coloured things. “All flesh, 
even that of the world, radiates beyond itself,”45 Merleau-Ponty writes. The 
intentional arc from Phenomenology of Perception is in The Visible and the 
Invisible attributed to the world itself.
Flesh is Merleau-Ponty’s concept for the common mode of being that 
transgresses the opposition between subject and object, perceiver and 
perceived. Crossing the borders between materiality and spirituality, it 
reminds us that man should no longer be seen as the agent of synthesis, 
holding a multiplicity together, and the world should no longer be seen 
as a static collection of things. Both are parts of a “system of exchanges.”46 
Nature does not have to appear as organised form for our understanding 
to feel at home. We are at home in nature because we are a part of it our-
selves, physical bodies participating in the exchanges and structures of 
reversibility. This participation makes it possible for us to experience and 
comprehend the manifold as manifold – as a complex and always trans-
forming structure – and not only, as Kant claimed, understand the cases 
where the imagination offers us a clear form corresponding to the form 
of a concept. Because the pre-objective universality, flesh, is the point of 
origin both of facticity and significance, the reconciliation is always al-
ready carried out. Flesh is concrete and particular – and thus facticity – 
but because the concrete thing is always a special kind of thing, it is also 
meaning: “The inauguration of the where and when, the possibility and 
exigency for the fact; in a word, facticity, what makes the fact be a fact. 
And, at the same time, what makes the fact have meaning, makes the frag-
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mentary facts dispose themselves about ‘something’.”47 Particulars’ being 
something results from the exchanges between things, as colours result 
from exchanges of light. The things participate in a connection of signifi-
cance by being lined with a “fabric of invisible being.”48 
A vision in general
The system of intertwining offers a solution to the principal problem from 
Phenomenology of Perception, “how vision can be brought into being from 
somewhere without being enclosed in its perspective.”49 If subjectivity is 
the place where intertwining and reciprocity occur, it becomes something 
we share, something oscillating between us, not a private property fixated 
to each of us separately. Because universality is established already on 
the perceptual level the classical problem of solipsism does not arise. The 
Kantian universal reason is transformed to a universal visibility where 
perception is an event in “an intercorporeal being”50:
There is here no problem of the alter ego because it is not I who see, not he 
who sees, but an anonymous visibility inhabits both of us, a vision in general, 
in virtue of that primordial property that belongs to the flesh, being here and 
now, of radiating everywhere and for ever, being an individual, of being also a 
dimension and a universal.51
If we follow Merleau-Ponty’s suggestion and turn to art to understand 
metaphysics, we may view AK Dolven’s film between two mornings52 as a 
direction of this universal perceptibility. Imagine an uncut, four minute 
long film showing four naked bodies on a beach, looking at the sea. Their 
arms are invisible and their skulls clean-shaven. There is no sound except 
the ticking of the spool. Nothing happens except the nearly impercep-
tible changes of light and the small waves coming towards the spectators 
as an endless repetition. Through a reciprocal play between light, space 
and time a perceptual reversibility is performed. Visibility comes from 
everywhere through an all-embracing mirror-structure, where light and 
darkness are exchanged between the elements. The four figures on the 
beach multiply the perspective, but because of the spread of light and 
the extension of the landscape they divide point of view. Their visions 
are at rest at the same point, even if their gazes are parallel. We are given 
a depth without central perspective, a time without direction, a mutual 
perception without a shared place to see from or a common object to look 
at. Perception is produced as a structure of intertwining and exchange. 
The audience enters as viewers at the back row: the experience of art is 
directed as a sharing of perceptual field.
20
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Kaare Espolin Johnson, Juksafiskere. 1955. © Gisle Espolin Johnson/bono.
AK Dolven, between two mornings. 35 mm film, 2004.
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The effacement of differences
Merleau-Ponty has been criticised for ending in a monistic philosophy 
à la Schelling, where the difference between I and world dissolves in an 
all-embracing anthropomorphism: ”there is no essential otherness nor 
real development within Being”,53 claims Robert Burch. The community 
of anonymous visibility immediately reproduces the solipsism it should 
efface. “The subtlety of what is said of the visible and its relation to the 
flesh does not rule out the solipsistic character of this touch(ing) between 
the world and the subject, of this touch(ing) of the visible and the seer in 
the subject itself”,54 Luce Irigaray sighs. If every exchange is to be seen as 
reversible, all differences will disappear. “All that remains to be said is that 
the world is isomorphic with the subject and vice versa, and the whole is 
sealed up in a circle. Nothing new happens, only this permanent weaving 
between the world and the subject.”55
The critique by Luce Irigaray is interesting from our perspective, be-
cause she points to the connection between the effacing of the border 
between man and world and a dissolving of the differentiation in the 
subject, as differentiation of our senses, and between the subjects, as the 
willingness to see the other as a different other. Like the un-individuated 
bodies in between two mornings we are sitting on a beach seeing the waves 
brake: ”We never catch sight of each other, and we do not see each other’s 
eyes.”56
The utopia of reversibility and the question of style 
Merleau-Ponty, however, is attentive to the danger of monism. By postu-
lating an immanent fission or abyss in the concept of reversibility he ad-
mits the necessity of an opening towards differentiation. The circular rela-
tions between us and the world are possible “by virtue of the fundamental 
fission or segregation of the sentiment and the sensible.”57 For exchanges 
to be possible there have to be differences to be reversed. Because every 
exchange creates new openings, differentiation and segregation happen 
in the same moment reversibility is displayed, so that reversion can never 
be completed. All experience thus implies an element of incompleteness, 
it is always something that exceeds integration. The concept intentional 
arc from Phenomenology of Perception attributes this capacity to exceed 
to the subject. In his later texts the transgression is situated on both sides 
of the I-world relation, and appears as interceptions or postponements of 
the postulated exchanges. As an echo of the regulative character of Kant’s 
principle of finality of nature, reversibility appears as “always imminent 
and never realized in fact.”58
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This postponement of the realisation of a factual reversibility settles as 
interceptions and displacements in the argumentative structure, where no 
statements could be taken as immutable proposition. Also the insight in 
the postponement is postponed. In the essay “Intertwining – The Chiasm” 
this is striking. Through a structure of slippages and explicated displace-
ments the reversibility postulated at the beginning is recognised as a utopia 
towards the end. The quotation above begins: “To begin with, we spoke 
summarily of a reversibility of the seeing and the visible, of the touching 
and the touched. It is time to emphasize that it is a reversibility always im-
minent.”59 The textual web not only performs reversibility of experience by 
offering the argument in a literary and sensual style, also the limitations of 
the exchanges are performed. This is necessary because the limitations are 
not understood as a transcendental a priori border, but a factual delay we 
experience in the world. Again Merleau-Ponty looks down at his hands: “My 
left hand is always on the verge of touching my right hand touching things, 
but I never reach coincidence; the coincidence eclipse at the moment of 
realization.”60 
In Irigaray’s critique of Merleau-Ponty the main point is, as mentioned, 
that the difference of the other emerges together with the difference be-
tween man and world. The structure of fissions and segregations seems, 
at first sight, to open our experiences to the exisistence of the other. Be-
cause I could not accomplish the exchanges myself, I need the gaze of the 
other as a necessary complement to mine. The other must complete the 
blind spots in my field of vision for the world to be whole; we must rely on 
each other for the openings to close. In Phenomenology of Perception this 
necessary view from the outside was attributed to the chimney, the walls 
and the tables. In this withdrawal of the ontologisation of reversibility the 
supplementary view is recognised as the gaze of the other. Analogous to 
Kant who postulates Sensus Communis as “a necessary condition of the 
universal communicability of our understanding,”61 and claims that we 
must assume that our cognitive faculties are similar in all of us, Merleau-
Ponty recognises the perception of the other as a condition for both our 
perception of the world and our self-perception: “As soon as I see, it is 
necessary that the vision … be doubled by a complementary vision or with 
another vision: myself seen from without.”62 
The theory of the other as a necessary supplement is, however, soon 
extended to a theory of the other as an aspect of a generalised perceptibil-
ity. My different senses give me one experience of one thing, and are thus 
reversible. Why should I not be able to extend this experience of synergy 
and exchange to include the perception of the other? “Why would not the 
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synergy exist among different organisms, if it is possible within each? 
Their landscapes interweave, their actions and their passions fit together 
exactly.”63 To enter into a perceptual universality is to assume that the 
perceptions of the other are or could have been reversible with mine. 
Merleau-Ponty claims that this mutual reversibility could be possible only 
if the idea of a unity of consciousness is abandoned and the differentia-
tions between me and the other are effaced: “This is possible as soon as we 
no longer make belongingness to one same ‘consciousness’ the primordial 
definition of sensibility, and as soon as we rather understand it as the 
return of the visible upon itself, a carnal adherence of the sentient to the 
sensed and of the sensed to the sentient.”64 In this open field of percepti-
bility Narcissus meets another Narcissus in an “intercorporeity.”65 There 
is no hymen between my hand and the hand of the other. “[W]hy, when 
touching the hand of the other, would I not touch in it the same power to 
espouse the things that I have touched in my own?”66 The experience of 
the other as an experience of a different view is immediately transformed 
into an experience of “a vision in general.”67 Merleau-Ponty substitutes the 
regulative demand for agreement in judgements by a model of open com-
plementarity. Kant’s regulative demand is, however, always con fronted 
with the disagreements of empirical subjects. This is why taste needs cul-
tural education.68 When universality is to be displayed in the empirical 
field of the world, there seem to be no places for individuality and differ-
ences to hide; if not art may give us a hint?
Art as experience of the worlds looking back
As Kant, Merleau-Ponty turns to art, especially to painting, for investi-
gation of our relation to nature and to each other. Painting is seen as a 
corpor eal metaphysic,69 a manual praxis that investigates the reversibility 
in the world. While philosophy can only imitate the exchanges through 
the linguistic web, art can exhibit both the exchanges and their borders 
and with this demonstrate how the world is given as something different 
from us. Merleau-Ponty insists that art is neither a mirror for man’s cogni-
tive faculties nor a representation of the world, but something that lets the 
world speak: “No longer is it a matter of speaking about space and light, 
but of making space and light, which is there, speak to us.”70 The painter 
is animated by a philosophy that lets vision “reassume its fundamental 
power of manifestation, of showing more than itself.”71 He ex hibits a cor-
poreal metaphysic by working through the reversible interplays between 
hand and eye, tactility and visuality. “Indeed we cannot imagine how a 
mind could paint,” Merleau-Ponty writes. ”It is by lending his body to the 
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world the artist changes the world into paintings.”72 Works of art, as man, 
are seen as places where the exchanges happen. By a rehearsal of the 
multiple works of crossing and exchanging every perception implies, they 
exhibit the factuality of the processes of exchanging, and thereby the real-
ity of the world. “A painter cannot agree that our openness to the world 
is illusory or indirect, that what we see is not the world itself, or that 
the mind has to do only with its thoughts or another mind.”73 The move-
ments of the hand come into being in interplay with something outside 
the body. Merleau-Ponty replaces the metaphor of re-production with a 
metaphor of encounters; to be able to paint is to let oneself be penetrated 
by the radiation of the world. He quotes Klee: “the trees were looking at 
me, were speaking to me … I was there, listening … I think that the painter 
must be penetrated by the universe and not want to penetrate it.”74 To 
paint is to recreate the world as a power of sight, the world’s gaze back. 
This is why art is “the voice of the light.”75 It produces signification, not by 
being a subjective projection, but because it participates in the real plays 
of exchanges in the real world, where all signification is produced. 
Painting thus shows us the world without representing it. The painter 
works through the exchanges in the world, the continuous play of light, 
structures and colours, to establish colours, perspective and depth in the 
picture. To paint a colour and a form, you always have to use other colours 
and project the form in a way not objectively given. For the grass to look 
green you must add red. For the line to look straight, it must be a bit lop-
sided. If a painting is going to grasp the world, it must play through the 
plays in and between colours and forms, which means that it must explore 
its own design, be auto-reflexive. Through exploring how colours and lines 
influence each other on the canvas, the painter shows the reversi bility of 
the world, how colour, light, movements, warmth and nutrition continu-
ously exchange. This means that a painting must be auto-figurative to be 
figurative: “Ultimately the painting relates to nothing at all among the 
experienced things unless it is first of all ‘autofigurative’”76 it can only 
represent something by “being a ‘spectacle of nothing’, by breaking the 
‘skin of things’ to show how the things become things and how world 
become world.”77 As auto-reflection, painting explores the auto-reflection 
of the world. 
The work of art thus participates in the intertwining and exchanges 
of the world, and to be a spectator is to participate in this participation, 
to look through or together with the picture, not to look at it. Works of 
art offer us a sharing of perceptual mood that open us onto the meaning 
of the world: “Rather than seeing it, I see according to, or with it.”78 This 
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invitation to share addresses us as bodies in the world, because it is as 
bodies we are able to participate in the exchanges: “[I]t does not offer the 
mind an occasion to rethink the constitutive relations of things, but rather 
it offers the gaze traces of vision, from the inside, in order that it may 
espouse them; it gives vision that which clothes it within, the imaginary 
texture of the real.”79 Through painting we get access to bodily encounters 
in the world.
Art as self-portrait
The experience of art thus seems to save the world as an other for the 
viewer, but the body of the other still remains to be investigated. If we look 
closer at Merleau-Ponty’s critique of art, we will see that what he focuses 
on is the artist’s gaze onto the world, the same gaze investigated in between 
two mornings. The gaze of the artist is like “the ‘round eye of the mirror’” a 
“prehuman way of seeing things.”80 As a mirror, painting displays how the 
world comes into being for us: The painter asks the mountains to “unveil 
the means, visible and not otherwise, by which it makes itself mountain 
before our eyes.”81 This is the same project Merleau-Ponty attributes to 
philosophy: “It is the things themselves, from the dept of their silence, 
that (it) /philosophy/ wishes to bring to expression.”82 The subject-object 
dichotomy from Phenomenology of Perception is left behind, but the prob-
lem is still the encounter with the world.
Painting, however, also shows man as a part of the world. As art dis-
plays an encounter with the forest and the mountains, it can display an 
encounter with the other: “The mirror’s phantom draws my flesh into the 
outer world, and at the same time the invisible of my body can invest its 
psychic energy in the other bodies I see. Hence my body can include ele-
ments drawn from the body of another, just as my substance passes into 
them; man is a mirror for man. Mirrors are instruments for a universal 
magic that converts things into spectacle, spectacle into things, myself 
into another, and another into myself.”83 Here the other seems to be found 
through the mirror of art.
Merleau-Ponty does not, however, ask for the difference between our 
encounters with the world and encounters with each other. He writes 
about the living smile on the canvas, and gives Cézanne’s painting Mont. 
Saint-Victoire as an example. He writes about Cezanne’s landscapes, 
Klee’s leaves of holly and how paintings present objects. Even when he 
discusses Matisse’s drawings of women, he uses them as examples of how 
we see and paint things; “to constitute it as nude, as face as flower.”84 This 
displacement of perspective is not due to an unconscious slippage, but 
Ingebjørg Seip
26
is a consequence of Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the nature of the 
perceptual fellowship. We get access to the other only through participa-
tion in a common world: “But at the very moment that I think I share the 
life of another, I am rejoining it only in its ends, its exterior poles. … it is 
the thing itself that opens unto me the accesses to the private world of 
another.” 85 The parallel view is producing the fellowship: “we are two wit-
nesses capable of hovering over the same true object.”86 The consequence 
is that not only the difference between man and thing, but also the dif-
ference between the other and me avoids attention. The self-portrait be-
comes the paradigm of the encounter, embodying both sides of the vision 
in the same all-embracing visibility we have already seen in between two 
mornings. The painters paint themselves “as if to attest to there being a 
total or absolute vision, leaving nothing outside, including themselves.”87 
In the process of saying the world Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perceptual 
intertwining does seem to efface the other as other.
In the discussion of art-criticism in relation to Phenomenology of Per-
ception I used the concept phenomenological realism to articulate how the 
perceptual field is shaped by movements and corporeal interaction and 
showed how this phenomenological space could be seen as the space dis-
played in modern art. As a consequence of the shift in focus from the cor-
poreal aspect of subjectivity to the reciprocal exchanges, the question of 
space and movement is transformed in Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophy. 
He no longer discusses the corporeal experience of movement in one’s 
own body, but how movements appears from the outside. Seen from the 
outside movements raise the problem of the relation between time and 
space. “Movement is given, says Rodin, by an image in which the arms, 
the legs, the trunk, and the head are taken at a different instant, an image 
which therefore portraits the body in an attitude which it never at any 
instant really held.”88 Merleau-Ponty’s examples are Géricault’s paintings 
of horses. What produces realism from this perspective is the temporaliza-
tion of the gaze through a projection of time into space, not the depiction 
of space as it is experienced as a field for our own movements. “It is the 
artist who is truthful, while the photograph lies, for, in reality, time never 
stops.”89 For Merleau-Ponty Géricault’s paintings do not represent how it 
feels to ride, but how it feels to view a rider. The distance to the problem 
of movements displayed in the pictures of Espolin Johnson is striking. 
Movements are no longer understood as constitutive elements in the gaze 
viewing, as a knowledge of how to row a boat or walk up a mountain, 
but are sought for in the movements of the paint brush and in the object 
depicted.
Towards an Aesthetics of Reversibility
27
In the film by AK Dolven the distant and parallel view appears as a 
commentary to the modern experience of loss of practical fellowship. The 
absence of manual forms of praxis settles in perception as a passive lone-
liness and a naturalization of the cultural and technical arrangements. 
Stripped of all individuality and tools for communication and action – 
hair, hands, legs, mouths, eyes – the bodies appear as nature. The women 
blend in like stones on the beach just like the contents of the beauty-bag 
appear as shells in the sand. The audience of the film doubles the contem-
plating situation, sitting unmoving in the dark. In a culturally constructed 
event we are all alone together against the sea, waiting. As a critical ob-
jection the film is a commentary to the modern paralyses of the subject. 
In Merleau-Ponty’s anti-anthropocentric philosophy these self-referential 
and critical elements are lacking, and the alienation is not recognised. 
The subordination of the encounter with the other under our encounter 
with the world therefore appears as an ontological condition. Through 
his discussion of perception and the worlds gaze back, his late philosophy 
gives us a fruitful theoretical articulation of how the relation between 
man and world is displayed in modern art. He draws however, in his eager 
to purify experience from the subjective account, attention away from 
investigations of physical self-reflection and corporeal intersubjectity in 
arts, aspects displayed by the subject-oriented theory in Phenomenology of 
Perception. In many projects of contemporary art this bodily contribution 
is the essential part, as seen for example in art-projects by Ann Hamilton, 
Janie Antonio or Kirsten Justesen. 90 
The impure beauty and the contribution of the subject 
In Kant’s aesthetics the withdrawing of the purification of the subjective 
account allows man’s corporeal self-reflection in art to be seen. The Cri-
tique of Judgement tells us that only where we are able to disregard the 
theoretical and practical interests of the subject may we experience a pure 
beauty. The pure beauty should be something outside man’s constitutive 
field, and the perceiving subject stands on the border trying to experi-
ence the world independent of his own imprints. This border is, however, 
impossible for Kant to draw, as Jacques Derrida has shown.91 Neither is 
it possible to arrange the examples into the classifications of the theory, 
nor is the pure beauty sufficiently fixated to be the ideal of beauty. In 
Kant’s retraction of the demand for purity he claims that the aesthetic 
experience of finality of form is most clear in man’s confrontation with 
representations of man, because the arrangement of the manifold here is 
related to an internal finality. A statue or a portrait exhibits a thing in the 
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world that itself “is able to determine his ends by reason.”92 The subjective 
demand for finality is present both in viewer and the viewed. The contri-
bution of the subject is thus reflected and redoubled instead of effaced. 
Anthropocentrism is reintroduced at the moment it seems to have been 
overcome.
If we return to Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophy looking for an equiva-
lent self-referential focus of man, we do not find an encounter with the 
other through art, but an encounter with the other as if he was a work of 
art, a strange statue. The reciprocal touching between man and man as 
art is the beginning of expression: “For the first time, the body no longer 
couples itself up with the world, it clasps another body, applying itself to 
it carefully with its whole extension, forming tirelessly with its hands the 
strange statue which in its turn gives everything it receives … And hence-
forth movement, touch, vision, applying themselves to the other and to 
themselves, return towards their source and, in the patient silent labour 
of desire, begin the paradox of expression.”93 The touch of the other is the 
origin of language. It seems, however, to be a secondary experience, a for 
the first time, after the coupling with the world. 
My question to the text is whether the use of metaphors may be turned 
around, so that our meetings with a real statue can be seen as something 
exhibiting the paradox of expression. If we, as Merleau-Ponty does, see art 
as a perceptual investigation of the perceptual interplays that make sig-
nification possible, should not the encounter with the picture of another 
body display the production of meaning in a more significant way than 
an encounter with a picture of nature? What happens if we ask how the 
experience of the touching hand is understood in confrontation with a 
portrait of a man touching his left hand with his right? May a focus on the 
ideal of beauty, the human shape, unveil the impure of Merleau-Ponty’s 
late philosophy: The contribution of the subject? 
If the impure beauty is to be pursued, the concept phenomenological 
realism from our reading of Phenomenology of Perception gives us an in-
teresting approach. In the phenomenological realism, the impure, the con-
tribution of the subject, is what is exhibited in art. The picture of the other 
shows us the world imprinted by a bodily teleology, and through a corpor-
eal reading of the picture may we experience the experiences of the other. 
However, also the insights articulated in Merleau-Ponty’s later texts must 
be examined. Only a model where the interaction between man and world 
is seen as a mutual structure of reversibility can explain how works of art 
may point beyond themselves, towards the world. Through a critical use 
of Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophy we can learn to include the subjective 
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element without isolating it as constitutive factor. My suggestion is that the 
concept of reciprocity is awarded with an anthropocentric turn, so that it is 
our own position in the play of exchanges we focus on. Then the experience 
of art may show us the contribution of the subject, neither as a constitutive 
transcendental structure, nor as the one part of a chiasm between man and 
world, but as a factual sensus communis, a community of perception. If we 
perceive according to a picture, created by man, exhibiting man through the 
exchanges between material factors, we may experience that interchanges 
with the other opens our relation to the world. The parallel perception turns 
up as secondary. Does not the touch of the other occur before our hand 
touches the world?
The reversibility of sensations
Let us again turn to art to see how the encounter with the other can be 
staged. The installation Homo sapiens sapiens94 by Pipilotti Rist is inter-
esting as an example, because it displays our perceptions of the physical 
world as something that happens between us, and stages the other as a 
mirror that allows sharing of perceptions and feelings. The event occurs 
in a church no longer in use. As viewer, you step over a communion rail 
and lie down on a mattress on the floor. Looking at the ceiling, you experi-
ence pictures mirroring each other. You see bodies perceiving, touching 
and moving around in a landscape of leaves and plants. What happens is 
that you become part of the installation, and you recognize that your body 
is a mirror through which you can meet the other and perceive the other’s 
movements, pleasures and touches. You feel the guava in your own hand 
and the grass on your face. You sense their sensations in your own body. 
Homo sapiens sapiens shows us an alternative to the parallel view; shows 
us what will happen if we catch sight of each other. We experience that the 
feeling of perception is directly sharable through a mirroring structure be-
tween our bodies. Not only light, but also subjectivity is exchangeable and 
reversible. Through this reversibility of life between us and the pictures 
above our heads, we experience what it is like to be the other. Pipilotti 
Rist has produced an alternative to the lonely, modernistic, parallel gaze 
against an unlimited horizon, and taken the empty house of God back as 
a house of man. 
Merleau-Ponty has given us all the concepts we need to articulate this 
event of encounters, but tends to efface what he exhibits, subordinating 
everything to a generalised reversibility that does not distinguish between 
man and things. If we annul the banishment of the subjective account, we 
may get both a new understanding of man’s contribution to experience 
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Pipilotti Rist, Homo sapiens sapiens. Audio video installa-
tion (video still), Courtesy of the artist and Hauser & Wirth 
Zürich London, 2005. 
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and a new access to art. Work of art appears not only to be our other, 
an other standing beside us, a common being we can look at the world 
together with, but also to be our other by turning towards us. Perhaps 
the secret of art is its ability to conserve and emit some of the mirroring 
magic we experience in the relation to other people? To view a portrait of 
man gives us the feeling of being looked at, being touched, being moved 
by the other’s sensations. It thus shows us humanity as the ability to per-
form a reversibility of sensations and feelings, to let oneself be moved by 
the other. Art produces the exchanges between differences that theory 
struggles to give an account of. 
The experience of empathy and identification with the stranger has 
bewitched lovers of art from all social classes throughout the ages, but 
has been an absolute taboo for modern art-criticisms. Only an aesthetic 
that dares to re-think the emotional and corporeal relations between us 
and art, may release art-reception and help us understand why art is still 
important in our lives. Reflection of the intercorporeal circulation of sub-
jectivity is especially necessary to understand art that works with inter-
corporeal meetings, just as this work by Pipilotti Rist. The philosophy of 
Merleau-Ponty has opened the field and given us some fruitful concepts, 
and Kant has reminded us of the requirement of a recollection of our 
own subjectivity. The work to be done is to investigate the production of 
subjectivity in the perceptual exchanges between us through an investiga-
tion of our encounters with art. Kant taught us that the correctness of this 
assumption of mutual accord may still be seriously questioned, while the 
actual existence of contemporary art is patient to experience.95
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